II. FACTUAL RESULTS OF THE OBSTRUCTION INVESTIGATION ......................................... ............. 15
	E. The President's Efforts to Remove the Special Counsel.. .......................................... . 3. The Press Reports that the President is Being Investigated for Obstruction of Justice and the President Directs the White House Counsel to Have the Special Counsel Removed ............................................ .................. ..................... . 84
	III. LEGAL DEFENSES To THE APPLICATION OF OBSTRUCTION-OF-JUSTICE STATUTES To THE PRESIDENT ........ ...... .. .. 159 A. Statutory Defenses to the Applicat ion of Obstruction-Of-Justice Provisions to the Conduct Under Investigation ................................... ..... 160 1. The Text of Section 1512(c)(2) Prohibits a Broad Range of Obstructive Acts ..... .. ....................... .............. ....................... ..................... ......... 160 5. Other Obstruction Statutes Might Apply to the Conduct in this Investigation ............................. ............. .............................................................. 167 B. Constitutional Defenses to App lying Obstruction-Of-Justice Statutes to Presidential Conduct ............. ........................ .................... 168 1. The Requirement of a Clear Statement to Apply Statutes to Presidential Conduct Does Not Limit the Obstruction Statutes ................................. ............ 169 2. Separation-of -Powers Principles Support the Conclusion that Congress May Validly Prohibit Corrupt Obstructive Acts Carried Out Through the President's Official Powers .......................................................... ..................... .. 171 b. The Effect of Obstruction-of-Justice Statutes on the President's Capacity to Perform His Article II Responsibilities is Limited ................... .. 173 3. Ascertaining Whether the President Violated the Obstruction Statutes Would Not Chill his Performance of his Article II Duties ............................ ..... 178

B. Investigative and Evidentiary Considerations
After the appointment of the Special Counsel, this Office obtained evidence about the following events relating to potential issues of obstruction of justice involving the President:

	(a) The President 's January 27, 2017 dinner with former FBI Director James Comey in which the President reportedly asked for Comey's loyalty , one day after the White House had been briefed by the Department of Justice on contacts between former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn and the Russian Ambassador;
	(b) The President's February 14, 2017 meeting with Comey in which the President reportedly asked Comey not to pursue an investigation of Flynn;
	(c) The President's private requests to Comey to make public the fact that the President was not the subject of an FBI investigation and to lift what the President regarded as a cloud;
	(d) The President 's outreach to the Director of National Intelligence and the Directors of the National Security Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency about the FBI's Russia investigation ;
	(e) The President's stated rationales for terminating Comey on May 9, 2017, including statements that could reasonably be understood as acknowledging that the FBI's Russia investigation was a factor in Comey's termination; and
	(f) The President's reported involvement in issuing a statement about the June 9, 2016 Trump Tower meeting between Russians and senior Trump Campaign officials that said the meeting was about adoption and omitted that the Russians had offered to provide the Trump Campaign with derogatory information about Hillary Clinton.

Taking into account that information and our analysis of applicable statutory and constitutional principle s (discussed below in Volume II, Section III, infra), we determined that there was a sufficient factual and legal basis to further investigate potential obstruction-of -justice issues involving the President.

            President did agree to answer written questions on certain Russia-related topics , and he provided us with answers. He did not similarly agree to provide written answers to questions on obstruction topics or questions on events during the transition. Ultimately, while we believed that we had the authority and legal justification to issue a grand jury subpoena to obtain the President 's testimony, we chose not to do so. We made that decision in view of the substantial delay that such an investigative step would likely produce at a late stage in our investigation. We also assessed that based on the significant body of evidence we had already obtained of the President's actions and his public and private statements describing or explaining those actions , we had sufficient evidence to understand relevant events and to make certain assessments without the President's testimony. The Office's decision-making process on this issue is described in more detail in Appendix C,

 

	a. Obstructive act. According to Comey's account of his February 14, 2017 meeting in the Oval Office, the President told him, "I hope you can see your way clear to letting this go, to letting Flynn go .... I hope you can let this go." In analyzing whether these statements constitute an obstructive act, a threshold question is whether Comey's account of the interaction is accurate , and, if so, whether the President 's statements had the tendency to impede the administration of justice by shutting down an inquiry that could result in a grand jury investigation and a criminal charge.  After Comey's account of the President 's request to "let[] Flynn go" became public, the President publicly disputed several aspects of the story. The President told the New York Times that he did not "s hoo other people out of the room" when he talked to Comey and that he did not remember having a one-on-one conversation with Comey. 268 The President also publicly denied that he had asked Comey to "let[] Flynn go" or otherwise communicated that Comey should drop the investigation ofFlynn. 269 In private, the President denied aspects of Comey's account to White House advisors, but acknowledged to Priebus that he brought Flynn up in the meeting with Comey and stated that Flynn was a good guy. 270 Despite those denials, substantial evidence corroborates Comey's account. First, Comey wrote a detailed memorandum of his encounter with the President on the same day it occurred. Comey also told senior FBI officials about the meeting with the President that day, and their recollections of what Comey told them at the time are consistent with Comey's account. 271 Second, Comey provided testimony about the President's request that he " let[] Flynn go" under oath in congressional proceedings and in interviews with federal investigators subject to penalties for lying under 18 U.S.C . § I 00 l . Comey's recollections of the encounter have remained consistent over time. Third, the objective , corroborated circumstances of how the one-on-one meeting came to occur support Comey's description of the event. Comey recalled that the President cleared the room to speak with Comey alone after a homeland security briefing in the Oval Office, that Kushner and Sessions lingered and had to be shooed out by the President, and that Priebus briefly opened the door during the meeting, prompting the President to wave him away . While the President has publicly denied those details, other Administration officials who were present have confirmed Comey's account of how he ended up in a one-on -one meeting with the President. 272 And the President acknowledged to Priebus and McGahn that he in fact spoke to Comey about Flynn in their one-on-one meeting. Fourth, the President's decision to clear the room and, in particular , to exclude the Attorney General from the meeting signals that the President wanted to be alone with Comey , which is consistent with the delivery of a message of the type that Comey recalls, rather than a more innocuous conversation that could have occurred in the presence of the Attorney General. Finally, Comey's reaction to the President's statements is consistent with the President having asked him to "let[] Flynn go." Comey met with the FBI leadership team, which agreed to keep the President 's statements closely held and not to inform the team working on the Flynn investigation so that they would not be influenced by the President 's request. Comey also promptly met with the Attorney General to ask him not to be left alone with the President again, an account verified by Sessions, FBI Chief of Staff James Rybicki, and Jody Hunt, who was then the Attorney General's chief of staff. A second question is whether the President's statements, which were not phrased as a direct order to Comey, could impede or interfere with the FBI's investigation of Flynn . While the President said he "hope[d]" Comey could "let[] Flynn go," rather than affirmatively directing him to do so, the circumstances of the conversation show that the President was asking Comey to close the FBl's investigation into Flynn. First, the President arranged the meeting with Comey so that they would be alone and purposely excluded the Attorney General, which suggests that the President meant to make a request to Comey that he did not want anyone else to hear. Second , because the President is the head of the Executive Branch, when he says that he "hope s" a subordinate will do something , it is reasonable to expect that the subordinate will do what the President wants. Indeed, the President repeated a version of"let this go" three times, and Comey testified that he understood the President's statements as a directive, which is corroborated by the way Comey reacted at the time.
	b. Nexus to a proceeding. To establish a nexus to a proceeding, it would be necessary to show that the President could reasonably foresee and actually contemplated that the investigation of Flynn was likely to lead to a grand jury investigation or prosecution. At the time of the President's one-on-one meeting with Comey, no grand jury subpoenas had been issued as part of the FBI's investi ation into Fl nn. But Fl nn's lies to the FBI violated federal criminal law, , and resulted in Flynn's prosecution for violating 18 U .S.C. § 100 I. By the time the President spoke to Comey about Flynn, DOJ officials had informed McGahn , who informed the President, that Flynn 's statements to senior White House officials about his contacts with Kislyak were not true and that Flynn had told the same version of events to the FBI. McGahn also informed the President that Flynn 's conduct could violate 18 U.S .C. § l 001. After the Vice President and senior White House officials reviewed the underlying information about Flynn's calls on February 10, 2017, they believed that Flynn could not have forgotten his conversations with Kislyak and concluded that he had been lying. In addition, the President's instruction to the FBI Director to "let[] Flynn go" suggests his awareness that Flynn could face criminal exposure for his conduct and was at risk of prosecution.
	c. Intent. As part of our investigation, we examined whether the President had a personal stake in the outcome of an investigation into Flynn-for example , whether the President was aware of Flynn 's communications with Kislyak close in time to when they occurred, such that the President knew that Flynn had lied to senior White House officials and that those lies had been passed on to the public. Some evidence suggests that the President knew about the existence and content of Flynn's calls when they occurred, but the evidence is inconclusive and could not be relied upon to establish the President's knowledge. In advance of Flynn's initial call with Kislyak , the President attended a meeting where the sanctions were discussed and an advisor may have mentioned that Flynn was scheduled to talk to Kislyak. Flynn told McFarland about the substance of his calls with Kislyak and said they may have made a difference in Russia's response, and Flynn recalled talking to Bannon in early January 2017 about how they had successfully "stopped the train on Russia's response " to the sanctions. It would have been reasonable for Flynn to have wanted the President to know of his communications with Kislyak because Kislyak told Flynn his request had been received at the highest levels in Russia and that Russia had chosen not to retaliate in response to the request , and the President was pleased by the Ru ssian response , calling it a " [g]reat move." And the President never said publicly or internally that Flynn had lied to him about the calls with Kislyak. But McFarland did not recall providing the President-Elect with Flynn's read-out of his calls with Kislyak , and Flynn does not have a specific recollection of telling the President-Elect directly about the calls. Bannon also said he did not recall hearing about the calls from Flynn. And in February 2017, the President asked Flynn what was discussed on the calls and whether he had lied to the Vice President, suggesting that he did not already know. Our investigation accordingly did not produce evidence that established that the President knew about Flynn 's discussions of sanctions before the Department of Justice notified the White Hous e of those discussions in late January 2017. The evidence also does not establish that Flynn otherwise possessed information damaging to the President that would give the President a personal incentive to end the FBI's inquiry into Flynn 's conduct. Evidence does establish that the President connected the Flynn investigation to the FBI's broader Russia investigation and that he believed, as he told Christie, that terminating Flynn would end "the whole Russia thing." Flynn's firing occurred at a time when the media and Congress were raising questions about Russia's interference in the election and whether members of the President's campaign had colluded with Russia. Multiple witnesses recalled that the President viewed the Russia investigations as a challenge to the legitimacy of his election. The President paid careful attention to negative coverage of Flynn and reacted with annoyance and anger when the story broke disclosing that Flynn had discussed sanctions with Kislyak . Just hours before meeting one-on-one with Comey, the President told Christie that firing Flynn would put an end to the Russia inquiries . And after Christie pushed back , telling the President that firing Flynn would not end the Russia investigation , the President asked Christie to reach out to Comey and convey that the President liked him and he was part of "the team." That afternoon , the President cleared the room and asked Comey to "let[] Flynn go." We also sought evidence relevant to assessing whether the President 's direction to Comey was motivated by sympathy towards Flynn. In public statements the President repeatedly described Flynn as a good person who had been harmed by the Russia investigation, and the President directed advisors to reach out to Flynn to tell him the President "care[d]" about him and felt bad for him. At the same time, multiple senior adv isors, including Bannon, Priebus, and Hicks, said that the President had become unhappy with Flynn well before Flynn was forced to resign and that the President was frequently irritated with Flynn. Priebus said he believed the President's initial reluctance to fire Flynn stemmed not from personal regard , but from concern about the negative press that would be generated by firing the National Security Advisor so early in the Administration. And Priebus indicated that the President's post-firing expressions of support for Flynn were motivated by the President's desire to keep Flynn from saying negative things about him. The way in which the President communicated the request to Comey also is relevant to understanding the President's intent. When the President first learned about the FBI investigation into Flynn, he told McGahn , Bannon, and Priebus not to discuss the matter with anyone else in the White House. The next day, the President invited Comey for a one-on-one dinner against the advice of an aide who recommended that other White Hous e officials also attend. At the dinner, the President asked Comey for "loyalty" and, at a different point in the conversation , mentioned that Flynn had judgment issues. When the President met with Comey the day after Flynn's termination - shortly after being told by Christie that firing Flynn would not end the Russia investigation-the President cleared the room, even excluding the Attorney General , so that he could again speak to Comey alone. The President's decision to meet one-on-one with Comey contravened the advice of the White House Counsel that the President should not communicate directly with the Department of Justice to avoid any appearance of interfering in law enforcement activities. And the President later denied that he clear ed the room and asked Comey to "let[] Flynn go"- a denial that would have been unnecessary if he believed his request was a proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Finally, the President's effort to have McFarland write an internal email denying that the President had directed Flynn to discuss sanctions with Kislyak highlights the President 's concern about being associated with Flynn's conduct. The evidence does not establish that the President was trying to have McFarland lie. The President's request, however, was sufficiently irregular that McFarland-who did not know the full extent of Flynn 's communications with the President and thus could not make the representation the President wanted-felt the need to draft an internal memorandum documenting the President's request, and Eisenberg was concerned that the request would look like a quid pro quo in exchange for an ambassadorship.

In analyzing the President's reaction to Sessions 's recusal and the requests he mad e to Coats, Pompeo , Rogers , and Comey , the following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice:

	a. Obstructive act. The evidence shows that, after Comey's March 20, 2017 testimony , the President repeatedly reach ed out to intelligence agency leaders to discuss the FBI's investigation. But witnesses had different recollections of the precise content of those outreaches. Some ODNI officials recalled that Coats told them immediately after the March 22 Oval Office meeting that the President asked Coats to intervene with Comey and "stop " the investigation. But the first-hand witnesses to the encounter remember the conversation differently. Pompeo had no memory of the specific meeting , but generally recalled the President urging officials to get the word out that the President had not done anything wrong related to Russia. Coats recalled that the President asked that Coats state publicly that no link existed between the President and Russia , but did not ask him to speak with Comey or to help end the investigation. The other outreaches by the President during this period were similar in nature: The President asked Rogers if he could do anything to refute the stories linking the President to Russia, and the President asked Comey to make a public statement that would " lift the cloud " of the ongoing investigation by making clear that the President was not personally under investigation. These requests , while significant enough that Rogers thought it important to document the encounter in a written memorandum , were not interpreted by the officials who received them as directives to improperly interfere with the investigation.
	b. Nexus to a proceeding. At the time of the President 's outreaches to leaders of the intelligence agencies in late March and early April 2017, the FBI' s Russia investigation did not yet involve grand jury proceedings. The outreaches, however , came after and were in response to Comey's March 20, 2017 announcement that the FBI , as a part of its counterintelligence mission , was conducting an investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election. Comey testified that the investigation included any links or coordination with Trump campaign officials and would "include an assessment of whether any crimes wer e committed."
	c. Intent. As described above , the evidence does not establish that the President asked or directed intelligence agency leaders to stop or interfere with the FBI 's Russia investigationand the President affirmatively told Comey that if " some satellite" was involved in Russian election interference "it would be good to find that out. " But the President's intent in trying to prevent Sessions 's recusal, and in reaching out to Coats, Pompeo , Rogers , and Corn ey following Comey's public announcement of the FBT's Russia investigation , is nevertheless relevant to understanding what motivated the President 's other actions towards the investigation. The evidence shows that the President was focused on the Russia investigation's implications for his presidency - and, specifically, on dispelling any suggestion that he was under investigation or had links to Russia. In early March , the President attempted to prevent Sessions's recusal, even after being told that Sessions was following DOJ conflict-of-interest rules. After Sessions recused, the White House Counsel's Office tried to cut off further contact with Sessions about the matter, although it is not clear whether that direction was conveyed to the President. The President continued to raise the issue of Sessions's recusal and, when he had the opportunity, he pulled Sessions aside and urged him to unrecuse . The President also told advisors that he wanted an Attorney General who would protect him, the way he perceived Robert Kennedy and Eric Holder to have protected their presidents. The Pr.esident made statements about being able to direct the course of criminal investigations, saying words to the effect of, "You're telling me that Bobby and Jack didn't talk about investigations? Or Obama didn't tell Eric Holder who to investigate ?" After Comey publicly confirmed the existence of the FBT's Russia investigation on March 20, 2017, the President was "beside himself ' and expressed anger that Comey did not issue a statement correcting any misperception that the President himself was under investigation. The President sought to speak with Acting Attorney General Boente directly and told McGahn to contact Boente to request that Comey make a clarifying statement. The President then asked other intelligence community leaders to make public statements to refute the suggestion that the President had links to Russia , but the leaders told him they could not publicly comment on the investigation . On March 30 and April I I, against the advice of White House advisors who had informed him that any direct contact with the FBI could be perceived as improper interference in an ongoing investigation, the President made personal outreaches to Comey asking him to "lift the cloud" of the Russia investigation by making public the fact that the President was not personally under investigation. Evidence indicates that the President was angered by both the existence of the Russia investigation and the public reporting that he was under investigation, which he knew was not true based on Comey's represe ntations. The President complained to advisors that if people thought Russia helped him with the election, it would detract from what he had accomplished. Other evidence indicate s that the President was concerned about the impact of the Russia investigation on his ability to govern . The President complained that the perception that he was under investigation was hurting his ability to conduct foreign relations , particularly with Russia. The President told Coats he "can't do anything with Russia ," he told Rogers that "the thing with the Russians" was interfering with his ability to conduct foreign affairs, and he told Comey that "he was trying to run the country and the cloud of this Russia business was making that difficult. "

D. Events Leading Up To and Surrounding the Termination of FBI Director Comey

Overview

Comey was scheduled to testify before Congress on May 3, 2017. Leading up to that testimony , the President continued to tell advisors that he wanted Comey to make public that the President was not under investigation. At the hearing, Comey declined to answer questions about the scope or subjects of the Russia investigation and did not state publicly that the President was not under investigation. Two days later, on May 5, 2017, the President told close aides he was going to fire Comey, and on May 9, he did so, using his official termination letter to make public that Comey had on three occasions informed the President that he was not under investigation. The President decided to fire Comey before receiving advice or a recommendation from the Department of Justice ,. but he approved an initial public account of the termination that attributed it to a recommendation from the Department of Justice based on Comey 's handling of the Clinton email investigation. After Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein resisted attributing the firing to his recommendation, the President acknowledged that he intended to fire Comey regardless of the DOJ recommendation and was thinking of the Russia investigation when he made the decision. The President also told the Russian Foreign Minister , "I just fired the head of the F.B.I. He was crazy , a real nut job. I faced great pressure because of Russia. That's taken off ..... I'm not under investigation."

Evidence

1. Comey Testifies Before the Senate Judiciary Committee and Decline s to Answer Questions About Whether the President is Under Investigation

On May 3, 2017 , Comey was scheduled to testify at an FBI oversight hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee. 383 McGahn recalled that in the week leading up to the hearing, the President said that it would be the last straw if Comey did not take the opportunity to set the record straight by publicly announcing that the President was not under investigation. 384 The President had previously told McGahn that the perception that the President was under investigation was hurting his ability to carry out his presidential duties and deal with foreign leaders. 385 At the hearing, Comey declined to answer questions about the status of the Russia investigation, stating "[t]he Department of Justice ha[d] authorized [him] to confirm that [the Russia investigation] exists," but that he was "not going to say another word about it" until the investigation was completed. 386 Comey also declined to answer questions about whether investigators had "ruled out anyone in the Trump campaign as potentially a target of the criminal investigation," including whether the FBI had "ruled out the president of the United States." 387

Comey was also asked at the hearing about his decision to announce 11 days before the presidential election that the FBI was reopening the Clinton email investigation. 388 Comey stated that it made him "mi ldly nauseous to think that we might have had some impact on the election, " but added that "even in hindsight" he "would make the same decision." 389 He later repeated that he had no regrets about how he had handled the email investigation and believed he had "done the right thing at each turn." 390

In the afternoon following Comey's testimony, the President met with McGahn, Sessions, and Sessions's Chief of Staff Jody Hunt. 39 1 At that meeting, the President asked McGahn how Comey had done in his testimony and McGahn relayed that Comey had declined to answer questions about whether the President was under investigation. 392 The President became very upset and directed his anger at Sessions. 393 According to notes written by Hunt, the President said, "This is terrible Jeff. It's all because you recused. AG is supposed to be most important appointment. Kennedy appointed his brother. Obama appointed Holder. I appointed you and you recused yourself. You left me on an island. I can't do. anything." 394 The President said that the recusal was unfair and that it was interfering with his ability to govern and undermining his authority with foreign leaders. 395 Sessions responded that he had had no choice but to recuse, and it was a mandatory rather than discretionary decision. 396 Hunt recalled that Sessions also stated at some point during the conversation that a new start at the FBI would be appropriate and the President should consider rep lacing Comey as FBI director. 397 According to Sessions, when the meeting concluded, it was clear that the President was unhappy with Comey, but Sessions did not think the President had made the decision to terminate Comey. 398

Bannon recalled that the President brought Comey up with him at least eight times on May 3 and May 4, 2017 . 399 According to Bannon, the President said the same thing each time: "He told me three times I'm not under investigation. He's a showboater. He's a grandstander . I don't know any Russians. There was no collusion." 400 Bannon told the President that he could not fire Comey because "that ship had sailed ."40 1 Bannon also told the President that firing Comey was not going to stop the investigation, cautioning him that he cou ld fire the FBI director but could not fire the FBI. 402

2. The President Makes the Decision to Terminate Comey

The weekend following Comey's May 3, 2017 testimony , the President traveled to his resort in Bedminster, New Jersey . 403 At a dinner on Friday, May 5, attended by the President and various advisors and family members, including Jared Kushner and senior advisor Stephen Miller , the President stated that he wanted to remove Comey and had ideas for a letter that would be used to make the announcement. 404 The President dictated arguments and specific language for the letter, and Miller took notes. 405 As reflected in the notes, the President told Miller that the letter should start , "While I greatly appreciate you informing me that I am not under investigation concerning what I have often stated is a fabricated story on a Trump-Russia relationship - pertaining to the 2016 presidential election, please be informed that I, and I believe the American public - including Os and Rs - have lost faith in you as Director of the FBT."406 Following the dinner, Miller prepared a termination letter based on those notes and research he conducted to support the Pres ident 's arguments. 407 Over the weekend, the President provided several rounds of edits on the draft letter. 408 Miller said the President was adamant that he not tell anyone at the White House what they were preparing because the President was worried about leaks. 409

In his discussions with Miller , the President made clear that he wanted the letter to open with a reference to him not being under investigation. 410 Miller said he believed that fact was important to the President to show that Comey was not being terminated based on any such investigation. 411 According to Miller, the President wanted to establish as a factual matter that Comey had been under a " review period" and did not have assurance from the President that he would be permitted to keep his job. 412

The final version of the termination letter prepared by Miller and the President began in a way that closely tracked what the President had dictated to Miller at the May 5 dinner: "Dear Director Comey, While I greatly appreciate your informing me, on three separate occasions, that 1 am not under investigation concerning the fabricated and politically-motivated allegations of a Trump-Russia relationship with respect to the 2016 Presidential Election , please be informed that T, along with members of both political parties and , most importantly, the American Public , have lost faith in you as the Director of the FBI and you are hereby terminated." 413 The four-page letter went on to critique Comey's judgment and conduct, including his May 3 testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, his handling of the Clinton email investigation, and his failure to hold leakers accountable. 414 The letter stated that Comey had "asked [the President] at dinner shortly after inauguration to let [Comey] stay on in the Director's role , and [the President] said that [he] would consider it," but the President had "concluded that [he] ha[ d] no alternative but to find new leadership for the Bureau - a leader that restores confidence and trust." 415

In the morning of Monday, May 8, 2017 , the President met in the Oval Office with senior advisors , including McGahn , Priebus , and Miller, and informed them he had decided to terminate Comey. 416 The President read aloud the first paragraphs of the termination letter he wrote with Miller and conveyed that the decision had been made and was not up for discussion. 417 The President told the group that Miller had researched the issue and determined the President had the authority to terminate Comey without cause. 418 In an effort to slow down the decision-making process, McGahn told the President that DOJ leadership was currently discussing Comey's status and suggested that White House Counsel's Office attorneys should talk with Sessions and Rod Rosenstein, who had recently been confirmed as the Deputy Attorney General. 41 9 McGahn said that previously scheduled meetings with Sessions and Rosenstein that day would be an opportunity to find out what they thought about firing Comey. 420

At noon, Sessions, Rosenstein, and Hunt met with McGahn and White House Counsel's Office attorney Uttam Dhillon at the White House. 421 McGahn said that the President had decided to fire Comey and asked for Sessions's and Rosenstein's views. 422 Sessions and Rosenstein criticized Comey and did not raise concerns about replacing him. 423 McGahn and Dhillon said the fact that neither Sessions nor Rosenstein objected to replacing Comey gave them peace of mind that the President's decision to fire Comey was not an attempt to obstruct justice. 424 An Oval Office meeting was scheduled later that day so that Sessions and Rosenstein could discuss the issue with the President. 425

 At around 5 p.m., the President and several White House officials met with Sessions and Rosenstein to discuss Comey. 426 The President told the group that he had watched Comey's May 3 testimony over the weekend and thought that something was "not right" with Comey. 427 The President said that Comey should be removed and asked Sessions and Rosenstein for their views. 428 Hunt, who was in the room, recalled that Sessions responded that he had previously recommended that Comey be replaced. 429 McGahn and Dhillon said Rosenstein described his concerns about Comey's handling of the Clinton email investigation. 430

The President then distributed copies of the termination letter he had drafted with Miller, and the discussion turned to the mechanics of how to fire Comey and whether the President 's letter should be used.43 1 McGahn and Dhillon urged the President to permit Comey to resign, but the President was adamant that he be ftred.432 The group discussed the possibility that Rosenstein and Sessions could provide a recommendation in writing that Comey should be removed . 433 The President agreed and told Rosenstein to draft a memorandum, but said he wanted to receive it first thing the next morning . 434 Hunt 's notes reflect that the President told Rosenstein to include in his recommendation the fact that Comey had refused to confirm that the President was not personally under investigation. 435 According to notes taken by a senior DOJ official of Rosenstein 's description of his meeting with the President , the President said, "Put the Russia stuff in the memo." 436 Rosenstein responded that the Russia investigation was not the basis of his recommendation , so he did not think Russia should be mentioned . 437 The President told Rosenstein he would apprec iate it if Rosenstein put it in his letter anyway . 438 When Rosenstein left the meeting, he knew that Comey would be terminated , and he told DOJ co lleagues that his own reasons for replacing Comey were " not [the President's] reasons." 439

On May 9, Hunt delivered to the White House a letter from Sessions recommending Comey's removal and a memorandum from Rosenstein , addressed to the Attorney General, titled "Restoring Public Confidence in the FBJ."440 McGahn recalled that the President liked the DOJ letters and agreed that they should provide the foundation for a new cover letter from the President accepting the recommendation to terminate Comey. 44 1 Notes taken by Donaldson on May 9 reflected the view of the White House Counsel's Office that the President's original termination letter should"[ n Jot [seethe] light of day" and that it would be better to offer"[ n ]o other rationales" for the firing than what was in Rosenstein's and Sessions's memoranda. 442 The President asked Miller to draft a new termination letter and directed Miller to say in the letter that Comey had informed the President three times that he was not under investigation. 443 McGahn, Priebus, and Dhillon objected to including that language , but the President insisted that it be included. 444 McGahn, Priebus, and others perceived that language to be the most important part of the letter to the President. 445 Dhillon made a final pitch to the President that Comey should be permitted to resign , but the President refused . 446

Around the time the President's letter was finalized , Priebus summoned Spicer and the press team to the Oval Office, where they were told that Comey had been terminated for the reasons stated in the letters by Rosenstein and Sessions. 447 To announce Comey's termination , the White House released a statement, which Priebus thought had been dictated by the President. 448 In full, the statement read: "Today , President Donald J. Trump informed FBI Director James Comey that he has been terminated and removed from office. President Trump acted based on the clear recommendations of both Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein and Attorney General Jeff Sessions." 449

That evening, FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe was summoned to meet with the President at the White House. 450 The President told McCabe that he had fired Comey because of the decisions Comey had made in the Clinton email investigation and for many other reasons. 451 The President asked McCabe if he was aware that Comey had told the President three times that he was not under investigation. 452 The President also asked McCabe whether many people in the FBI disliked Comey and whether McCabe was part of the "resistance" that had disagreed with Comey's decisions in the Clinton investigation . 453 McCabe told the Pre sident that he knew Comey had told the President he was not under investigation , that most people in the FBI felt positively about Comey , and that McCabe worked "very closely" with Comey and was part of all the decisions that had been made in the Clinton investigation. 454

Later that evening, the President told his communications team he was unhappy with the press coverage of Comey's termination and ordered them to go out and defend him . 455 The President also called Chris Christie and, according to Christie, said he was getting "killed" in the press over Comey 's termination. 456 The President asked what he should do . 457 Christie asked , "Did you fire [Comey] because of what Rod wrote in the memo?", and the President responded, "Yes." 458 Christie said that the President should "get Rod out there " and have him defend the decision. 459 The President told Christie that this was a " good idea" and said he was going to call Rosenstein right away . 460

That night, the White House Press Office called the Department of Justice and said the White House wanted to put out a statement saying that it was Rosenstein's idea to fire Comey. 461 Rosenstein told other DOJ officials that he would not participate in putting out a "false story." 462 The President then called Rosenstein directly and said he was watching Fox News, that the coverage had been great, and that he wanted Rosenstein to do a press conference. 463 Rosenstein responded that this was not a good idea because if the press asked him , he would tell the truth that Comey's firing was not his idea. 464 Sessions also informed the White House Counsel's Office that evening that Rosenstein was upset that his memorandum was being po1trayed as the reason for Comey 's termination. 465

 In an unplanned press conference late in the evening of May 9, 2017 , Spicer told reporters, "It was all [Rosenstein]. No one from the White House. It was a DOJ decision ." 46 6 That evening and the next morning , White House officials and spokespeople continued to maintain that the President's decision to terminate Comey was driven by the recommendations the President received from Rosenstein and Sessions. 467

 In the morning on May 10, 2017, President Trump met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak in the Oval Office. 468 The media subsequently reported that during the May 10 meeting the President brought up his decision the prior day to terminate Comey, telling Lavrov and Kislyak: "T just fired the head of the F.B.I. He was crazy, a real nut job. I faced great pressure because of Russia. That's taken off. ... I'm not under investigation." 469 The President never denied making those statements, and the White House did not dispute the account, instead issuing a statement that said: "By grandstanding and politicizing the investigation into Russia's actions, James Comey created unnecessary pressure on our ability to engage and negotiate with Russia. The investigation would have always continued, and obviously, the termination of Comey would not have ended it. Once again , the real story is that our national security has been undermined by the leaking of private and highly classified information." 470 Hicks said that when she told the President about the reports on his meeting with Lavrov, he did not look concerned and said of Comey, "he is crazy." 471 When McGahn asked the President about his comments to Lavrov, the President said it was good that Comey was fired because that took the pressure off by making it clear that he was not under investigation so he could get more work done . 472

That same morning, on May 10, 2017, the President called McCabe. 473 According to a memorandum McCabe wrote following the call , the Pre sident asked McCabe to come over to the White House to discuss whether the President should visit FBI headquarters and make a speech to employees. 474 The President said he had received "hundreds" of messages from FBI employees indicating their support for terminating Comey. 475 The President also told McCabe that Comey should not have been permitted to travel back to Washington , D.C. on the FBI's airplane after he had been terminated and that he did not want Comey "in the building again," even to collect his belongings. 476 When McCabe met with the President that afternoon, the President , without prompting, told McCabe that people in the FBI loved the President, estimated that at least 80% of the FBI had voted for him, and asked McCabe who he had voted for in the 2016 presidential election. 477 ·

 In the afternoon of May 10, 2017, deputy press secretary Sarah Sanders spoke to the President about his decision to fire Comey and then spoke to reporters in a televised press conference. 478 Sanders told reporters that the President , the Department of Justice , and bipartisan members of Congress had lost confidence in Comey, " [a]nd most importantly, the rank and file of the FBI had lost confidence in their director. Accordingly, the President accepted the recommendation of his Deputy Attorney General to remove James Comey from his position." 479 In response to questions from reporters , Sanders said that Rosenstein decided "on his own" to review Comey's performance and that Rosenstein decided "on his own" to come to the President on Monday, May 8 to express his concerns about Comey. When a reporter indicated that the "vast majority" of FBI agents supported Comey, Sanders said , "Look, we've heard from countless members of the FBI that say very different things. " 48° Following the press conference, Sanders spoke to the President, who told her she did a good job and did not point out any inaccuracies in her comments. 481 Sanders told this Offic e that her reference to hearing from "co untless members of the FBI" was a "slip of the tongue ."482 She also recalled that her statement in a separate press interview that rank-and-file FBI agents had lost confidence in Comey was a comment she made "in the heat of the moment" that was not founded on anything. 483

Also on May I 0, 2017 , Sessions and Rosenstein each spoke to McGahn and expressed concern that the White House was creating a narrative that Rosenst ein had initiated the decision to fire Comey. 484 The White House Counsel's Office agreed that it was factually wrong to say that the Department of Justice had initiated Comey 's termination , 485 and McGahn asked attorneys in the White House Counsel's Office to work with the press office to correct the narrative . 486

The next day, on May 11, 2017 , the President participated in an interview with Lester Holt. The President told White House Counsel's Office attorneys in advance of the interview that the communications team could not get the story right, so he was going on Lester Holt to say what really happened. 487 During the interview , the President stated that he had made the decision to fire Comey before the President met with Rosenstein and Sessions. The President told Holt, "I was going to fire regardless of recommendation . . . . [Rosenstein] made a recommendation. But regardless of recommendation , I was going to fire Comey knowing there was no good time to do it."488 The President continued, "And in fact, when I decided to just do it, I said to myself-I said, you know, this Russia thing with Trump and Russia is a made-up story . It's an excuse by the Democrats for having lost an election that they should've won." 489

 In response to a question about whether he was angry with Comey about the Russia investigation , the President said, "As far as I'm concerned, I want that thing to be absolutely done properly." 490 The President added that he realized his termination of Comey "probably maybe will confuse people" with the result that it "might even lengthen out the investigation," but he "ha[d] to do the right thing for the American people " and Comey was "the wrong man for that position." 491 The President described Comey as "a showboat" and "a grandstander," said that "[t]he FBI has been in turmoil," and said he wanted "to have a really competent , capable director. "492 The President affirmed that he expected the new FBI director to continue the Russia investigation. 49 3

On the evening of May 11, 2017 , following the Lester Holt interview, the President tweeted, "Russia must be laughing up their sleeves watchin g as the U.S. tears itself apart over a Democrat EXCUSE for losing the election ."494 The same day, the media reported that the President had demanded that Comey pledge his loyalty to the President in a private dinner shortly after being sworn in . 495 Late in the morning of May 12, 2017, the President tweeted, "Again, the story that there was collusion between the Russians & Trump campaign was fabricated by Dems as an excuse for losing the election. "496 The President also tweeted , "James Comey better hope that there are no 'tapes' of our conversations before he starts leaking to the press!" and "When James Clapper himself, and virtually everyone else with knowledge of the witch hunt, says there is no collusion, when does it end? " 497

 Analysis

 In analyzing the President's decision to fire Comey, the following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice:

	a. Obstructive act. The act of firing Comey removed the individual overseeing the FBI's Russia investigation. The President knew that Comey was personally involved in the investigation based on Comey's briefing of the Gang of Eight , Comey's March 20, 2017 public testimony about the investigation, and the President's one -on-one conversations with Comey. Firing Comey would qualify as an obstructive act if it had the natural and probable effect of interfering with or impeding the investigation-for example, if the termination would have the effect of delaying or disrupting the investigation or providing the President with the opportunity to appoint a director who would take a different approach to the investigation that the President perceived as more protective of his personal interests. Relevant circumstances bearing on that issue include whether the President's actions had the potential to discourage a successor director or other law enforcement officials in their conduct of the Russia investigation . The President fired Comey abruptly without offering him an opportunity to resign, banned him from the FBI building, and criticized him publicly, calling him a " showboat" and claiming that the FBI was " in turmoil" under his leadership. And the President followed the termination with public statements that were highly critical of the investigation; for example, three days after firing Comey , the President referred to the investigation as a "witch hunt " and asked, "when does it end? " Those actions had the potential to affect a successor director 's conduct of the investigation. The anticipated effect of removing the FBI director, however , would not necessarily be to prevent or impede the FBI from continuing its investigation. As a general matter, FBI investigations run under the operational direction of FBI personnel levels below the FBI director. Bannon made a similar point when he told the President that he could fire the FBI director , but could not fire the FBI. The White House issued a press statement the day after Comey was fired that said, "The investigation would have always continued, and obviously, the termination of Comey would not have ended it." Tn addition, in his May 11 interview with Lester Holt, the President stated that he understood when he made the decision to fire Comey that the action might prolong the investigation. And the President chose McCabe to serve as interim dir ector, even though McCabe told the President he had worked "very closely " with Comey and was part of all the decisions made in the Clinton investigation.
	b. Nexus to a proceeding . The nexus element would be satisfied by evidence showing that a grand jury proceeding or criminal prosecution arising from an FBI investigation was objectively foreseeable and actually contemplated by the President when he terminat ed Corne y. Several facts would be relevant to such a showing. At .the time the President fired Comey, a grand jury had not begun to hear evidence related to the Russia investigation and no grand jury subpoenas had been issued . On March 20, 2017, however , Comey had announced that the FBI was investigating Russia's interference in the election , including "an assessm ent of whether any crimes were committed ." It was widely known that the FBI , as part of the Russia investigation , was investigating the hacking of the DNC's computers-a clear criminal offense.  In addition , at the time the President fired Comey, evidence indicates the President knew that Flynn was still under criminal investigation and could potentially be prosecuted, despite the President's February 14, 2017 request that Comey "let[] Flynn go." On March 5, 2017, the White House Counsel's Office was informed that the FBI was asking for transition-period records relating to Flynn - indicating that the FBI was still actively investigating him. The same day, the President told advisors he wanted to call Dana Boente, then the Acting Attorney Gen era l for the Russia investigation, to find out whether the White House or the President was being investigated. On March 31, 2017, the President signaled his awareness that Flynn remained in legal jeopardy by tweeting that "Mike Flynn should ask for immunity" before he agreed to provide testimony to the FBI or Congress. And in late March or early April, the President asked McFarland to pass a message to Flynn telling him that the President felt bad for him and that he should stay strong , further demonstrating the President's awareness of Flynn's criminal exposure.
	c. Intent. Substantial evidence indicates that the catalyst for the President 's decision to fire Comey was Comey 's unwillingness to publicly state that the President was not personally under investigation , despite the President's repeated requests that Comey make such an announcement. In the week leading up to Comey's May 3, 2017 Senate Judiciary Committee testimony , the President told McGahn that it would be the last straw if Comey did not set the record straight and publicly announce that the President was not under investigation. But during his May 3 testimony , Comey refused to answer questions about whether the President was being investigated. Comey's refusal angered the Presid ent, who criticized Sessions for leaving him isolated and exposed, saying "You left me on an island." Two days later, the President told advisors he had decided to fire Comey and dictated a letter to Stephen Miller that began with a reference to the fact that the President was not being investigated: "While I greatly appreciate you informing me that I am not under investigation concerning what I have often stated is a fabricated story on a Trump-Russia relationship .... " The President later asked Rosenstein to include "Russia" in his memorandum and to say that Comey had told the President that he was not under investigation . And the Pre sident 's final termination letter included a sentence , at the President's insistence and against McGahn ' s advice, stating that Comey had told the President on three separate occasion s that he was not under investigation. The President's other stated rationales for why he fired Comey are not similarly supported by the evid ence. The termination letter the President and Stephen Miller prepared in Bedminster

a. Our investigation found multiple acts by the President that were capable of exetting undue influence over law enforcement investigations, including the Russian-interference and obstruction investigations. The incidents were often carried out through one-on-one meetings in which the Presid ent sought to use his official power outside of usual channels. These actions ranged from efforts to remove the Special Counsel and to reverse the effe ct of the Attorney General 's recusal; to the attempted use of official power to limit the scope of the investigation; to direct and indirect contacts with witnesses with the potential to influence their testimony. Viewing the acts collectively can help to illuminate their significance. For example , the President 's direction to McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed was followed almost immediat ely by his direction to Lewandowski to tell the Attorney General to limit the scope of the Russia inve stigation to prospective election-interference only-a temporal connection that suggests that both acts were taken with a related purpose with respect to the investigation. The President 's efforts to influence the investigation were mostly unsuccessful, but that is largely because the persons who surrounded the President declined to carry out orders or accede to his requests. Comey did not end the investigation of Flynn, which ultimately resulted in Flynn's prosecution and conviction for lying to the FBI. McGahn did not tell the Acting Attorney General that the Special Counsel must be removed , but was instead prepared to resign over the President's order. Lewandowski and Dearborn did not deliver the President 's message to Sessions that he should confine the Russia investigation to future election meddling only. And McGahn refused to recede from his recollections about events surrounding the President's direction to have the Special Counsel removed, despite the President's multiple demands that he do so. Consistent with that pattern, the evidence we obtained would not support potential obstruction charges against the President's aides and associates beyond those already filed.

b. In considering the full scope of the conduct we investigated, the President's actions can be divided into two distinct phases reflecting a possible shift in the President's motives. In the first phase , before the President fired Comey, the President had been assured that the FBI had not opened an investigation of him personally. The President deemed it critically important to make public that he was not under investigation, and he included that information in his termination letter to Comey after other efforts to have that information disclosed were unsuccessful. Soon after he fired Comey, however, the President became aware that investigators were conducting an obstruction-of-justice inquiry into his own conduct. That awareness marked a significant change in the President's conduct and the start of a second phase of action. The President launched public attacks on the investigation and individuals involved in it who could possess evidence adverse to the President, while in private, the President engaged in a series of targeted efforts to control the investigation. For instance, the President attempted to remove the Special Counsel; he sought to have Attorney General Sessions unrecuse himself and limit the investigation; he sought to prevent public disclosure of information about the June 9, 2016 meeting between Russians and campaign officials; and he used public forums to attack potential witnesses who might offer adverse information and to praise witnesses who declined to cooperate with the government. Judgments about the nature of the President's motiv es during each phase would be informed by the totality of the evidence.